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United States private investments in Europe have been increasing
steadily since the end of the Second World War' Many of these invest-
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TABLE I
Value of American-Owned Foreign Assets
(all figures in $ millions)
Europe 1943 1946t 1962tt
Private Investment 4,418.3 2,743 14,460
Long Term
Direct 2,047.0 1,041 8,843
Securities 814.1 719 2,728
t The reduced 1943 figures reflect losses in Eastern Europe.
tt These figures also reflect increased market values over 1943.
Sources: Balance of Payment Statistical Supplement (1963); Survey of Current Busi-
ness (August 1963); Census of American-Owned Assets in Foreign Countries,
May 1943 (1947).
TABLE II
Value of American-Owned Foreign Securities
(all figures in $ millions)
Private Corporate
Obligations
Stocks, Common &
Preferred Total
1943 1943 1950 1943 1950
Europe 55.1 533.7 722.2 814.1 1600.5
France 2.5 	 • 29.8 92.7 40.8 206.8
Germany 14.5 68.9 132.8 125.4 182.9
U.K. 17.9 219.2 325.1. 312.4 822.3
Sources: Census of American-Owned Assets in Foreign Countries, May 1943 (1947);
Census of Private Foreign Investments in U.S. (1950).
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ments have been made in Britain,' France' and Germany.' The creation
of the European Common Market' opened up a new field to American
capital, and, subsequently, the creation of the European Free Trade
Association' added to the countries wooing American investors. Al-
though the primary need of Europe was for capital to acquire much-
needed raw materials, United States know-how and machinery was also
in great demand. One of the questions confronting American capitalists
was whether to gain control of existing facilities, or to open up new
enterprises within the countries concerned.
In many instances the attempt to control existing enterprises
resulted in unpleasant political repercussions,' and various protective
legislative devices were adopted.' In addition, exchange control regula-
tions hampered the free flow of capital and restricted the removal of
TABLE III
Transactions in Foreign Stock*
(all figures in $ millions)
1963
1959 1960 1961 1962 Jan -Nov.
Europe —174.4 —75.2 —24.9 —143.7 —24.2
France — 41.5 —42.1 —31.2 — 39.5 —25.4
Germany — 20.4 —17.7 —36.6 — 13.7 + 4.7
U.K. — 19.9 —42.1 —63.4 -I- 	 4.9 +19.6
* — means buying by U.S. investors exceeded selling by the indicated amount.
means selling by U.S. investors exceeded buying by the indicated amount.
This table reflects: (a) Buying stimulated by European Common Market; (b) Selling
stimulated by decline of market after May 1962 and (c) Selling stimulated by anticipation
of the Interest Equalization Tax, infra note 10.
Source: Treasury Bulletin (Jan. 1964).
2 Since no specific figures are available on portfolio investments, the above Tables are
referred to. Note also Dunning, American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry
(1958).
8 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ; 298 U.N.T.S. No. 4300
(1958).
o Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Stockholm, Nov. 20,
1959, Cmnd. 906 (London).
7 Note the repercussions in France when it was discovered that the majority of the
share capital of the Simca Car Company had come into the hands of American investors;
see also the absorption of an English subsidiary by Ford Motor Company, causing debate
in Parliament.
8 Though English law makes no special provisions for a corporation created by
foreign nations, this is the approach in France. Where it is intended to establish a corpora-
tion in France without the physical presence of the incorporators, Avis [Notice] No. 669
(Jan. 1959) requires that the Service des Changes [Exchange Control Branch] of the
Ministry of Finance, Directorate of External Finance, grant an authorisation to the
foreign incorporators. Where the incorporators are present in France, they must first ob-
tain a carte de sejour (Residence Permit) and must then apply for a carte de commercant
(Trading Permit). See Article I of the Law of November 12, 1938, as supplemented by
the Law of October 8, 1949 and the Decree of November 26, 1949. See further Nicholson,
The Significance of Treaties to the Establishment of Companies in 2 American Enterprise
in the European Common Market—A Legal Profile, Ch. IX (1962).
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profits. But with improvements in the balance of trade and the realisa-
tion that restrictions made it more difficult to attract American capital,
many of these temporary restrictions were lifted .° The flow of United
States capital abroad has been steady and has now begun to play a
a considerable part in the nation's economy, even to the extent of
causing some concern here." This became an especial problem when
private investors began to invest abroad to the detriment of the
domestic market."
This paper will investigate investments in corporate shares and the
transferability of such shares. An investor seeking to participate in the
capitalisation of corporate structures has to consider not only the pos-
sible return on his capital in the form of dividends but also the question
of liquidating his investment should a suitable market develop. We will
therefore consider the transferability of shares under English, French
and German laws and compare these laws with recent developments in
the United States, particularly those under Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code."
In the Anglo-American legal system, the corporate share represents
° Generally no difficulty was placed in the path of foreign investors wishing to
remove their profits; e.g., France: Avis No. 482 (Dec. 5, 1950). As to capital realisations,
note the distinction made in France for capital invested before 1949, which must be paid
into special "capital accounts" and can be repatriated only indirectly by following the
provisions of Avis No. 573 (July 11, 1954). For a full discussion of Exchange Control
Regulations in France from 1939-1960, see Jeantet, 1 American Enterprise in the European
Common Market—A Legal Profile, Ch. IV (1962). For Germany, where no restrictions
exist, see Runderlass Auszenwirtschaft Nr. 35/59 (April 29, 1959). This circular applies
to both investment in and creation of corporate structures and also to both the removal
of profits and capital realisations. For England, see Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money
(2d ed. 1954), containing an analysis of the Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6,
c. 14. See also the Control of Borrowing Order, 1958 S.I. 1958, No. 1208. See further
Doing Business with France, U.S. Dep't of Com. (1958); Summary of French Company
Law and Taxation, Bureau d'Etudes Fiscales (1963) ; Friedmann & Pugh, Legal Aspects of
Foreign Investment (1959).
10 See the provisions of the Interest Equalization Tax Bill, H.R. 8000 (March 9,
1964), at present under consideration by the Senate, intended to stop the "present drain"
of American dollars overseas.
11 "In 1962, U.S. residents purchased t10 billion of new foreign securities offered in
this country." American Bankers Ass'n, Statement on Balance of Payment 15 (1963). See
also Europe's Securities Lure U.S. Investors, 35 Investor's Reader, No. 8, p.1 (October 12,
1960), dealing with the resultant development of the American Depositary Receipt (A.D.R.)
discussed infra. Of note here is that A.D.R. enables American investors to both participate
in the European Market and retain the fluidity of their investments, while still complying
with the foreign exchange control regulations. The actual foreign securities are held by
the issuers of the A.D.R. as authorised depositories in the country cdncerned. Only the
A.D.R., an American security relating to foreign investments (see UCC H 8-102(a) (fu)-
(iv), 8-320), is traded in this country.
12 The Uniform Commercial Code has now been enacted in thirty legal systems
within the United States. More than 75% of the population of the United States is within
Code states. Of further note is that, although the Code and the Uniform Act for the
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers do not conflict, the Code enlarges the
provisions of the Act, yet most States have retained the Act on their statute books; ex
abundant? cautela?
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a right of participation not only in the distribution of profits, if any,
but also in the management and control of corporate activities through
the exercise of voting rights in general meetings." Even though active
participation in management and control has become somewhat minor
in importance because of the revolution to professional managers, both
legislation and the articles of association of most corporations require
that a close contact be maintained between the corporate management
and the shareholder!' In France and Germany the inter-relationship
of management and shareholders is much less apparent. This is illus-
trated in France by the shift of control from the assemble general to the
resident du conseil d'administration, which has been interrupted only
slightly by the introduction of the comite d'enterprise, which introduces
the element of labour into the managerial council." In Germany the
policy of depositing bearer shares with banks has added to this prob-
lem." Banks, by virtue of their vast shareholding resulting therefrom,
have been able to be represented on the Board of Corporations, and
have thereby established control by securing nominees favourable to
their policy. It is therefore possible to conclude that in France and in
Germany, the investor's duty is ended with his contribution to the
capital, with a possible, but not a necessary, concomitant right to par-
ticipate in the profits realised from the pooling of capital resources."
This depersonalisation of the shareholder-corporation relationship has
its base in the greater freedom to transfer rights once they are em-
bodied in a document." Nonetheless, it must be remembered that
18 See e.g., Cower, Modern Company Law (2d ed. 1957); Ballantine, Corporations
(Rev. ed. 1946); Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
14 See Berle & Means, op. cit. supra note 13. Also Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings
and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 Va. L. Rev. 653 (1951).
18 Church; Business Associations Under the French Law, Part 4 (1960); as to the
comitd d'entreprise, see Ordinance of February 22, 1945; Act of May 11, 1946; Act of
August 12, 1950. A steady evolution of the reduction of the importance of the stock-
holders' meeting can be traced since 1940. Note especially the Act of November 16, 1940,
as modified by the Act of March 4, 1943. That Act, though intended to impose more
responsibility on the board of directors, resulted in concentrating power in the hands of
the president du tomtit d'administration. For the German equivalent to the tousled
d'entreprise, see Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of October 11, 1952 and the Gesetz ueber die
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitsnehmer in den Aufsichtsraeten und Vorstaenden der Unter-
nehmen des Bergbau und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie, May 21, 1951 and
the Law of July 15, 1957.
16 See Hueck, Gesellschaf tsrecht (8th ed. 1958); Wuerdinger, Aktien Becht (1959).
17 See Wuerdinger, op. cit. supra note 16, Mitgliedschaft und Aktie II, Content of
Membership 2(a); see also Aktiengesetz, Jan. 30, 1937, § 52 Abs. 1 and 212. See also
§ 60.
18 Germany: Aktiengesetz, Jan. 30, 1937, § 10 indicates that shares are either bearer
or order papers.
France: Commercial Code, art. 35 relates to bearer shares—action au porteur while
Article 36 deals with nominal shares—action nominative. As is indicated by Wuerdinger,
op. cit. supra note 16, "The incorporation of membership into the share certificate has as
its purpose the promotion of negotiability." The effect is that the right thus becomes incor-
porated into the certificate and is transferable with it.
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membership rights are not dependent upon the existence of a share
certificate, which is but evidence of membership in the corporation.
One further point to be noted is the absence of the no-par value
share in English, French and German laws. Both German and French
law require that shares not only have a par value, but also provide that
par value be not less than a minimum amount." Although, this is
closely linked with the requirement of a minimum capital, the futility of
linking par value with maintenance of capital has been clearly demon-
strated by Professor Gower, 2° commenting on the need for reform in
England:
Until recently there has been no public demand for the intro-
duction of no-par shares in England, the untutored people
who have been misled into supposing that a £1 share is cheap if
it can be bought on the market for Is. and expensive if it costs
30s. have not been sufficiently organised or influential to pro-
duce audible outcry. In the last few years, however, com-
panies have found that a fixed nominal capital leads to
ignorant criticism of the extent of their profits, which appear
excessive in comparison with that capital, although fair
enough in comparison with the true capital employed.'
Although there have been recommendations to introduce no-par value
shares," the English Parliament has not yet taken any steps to amend
the law" so as to allow the issue of such shares.24
The reason advanced for the need to have a par value requirement
in German and in French law is that a corporation must have its full
capital subscribed before it can commence business." It is also argued
19 France: The par value is a least 100 new francs per share. To form a corporation
(soaked anonyme) there must be at least seven stockholders. The value here is in the
new heavy franc. The Decree of August 4, 1949, article 28, required that the value of the
shares shall be not less than 10,000 "light" francs. Prior to that the Act of July 24, 1867
(this is the basic law applicable to French corporations) article 1 required only 1000
francs.
Germany: Aktiengesetz (AktG.) § 6 Abs. 2. The minimum capitalisation is 100,000
D.M. unless permission for a lower figure has been obtained from the Minister of Justice
or the Minister of Economics. Although AktG. § 6 Abs. 2 refers to a specified amount of
capital, 169 allows "authorised capital" which may be called up within five years of
formation. Money received from shares sold above par are placed into a capital reserve
fund; § 130. The minimum par value is 100 D.M. under the DeutschMarkbilanzgesetz.
20 Op. cit. supra note 13.
21 Id. at 115-16.
22 See Cohen Report (Cmnd. 6659/1945) g 18. This is the Report which preceded the
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38. See also the favourable report of the Depart-
mental Committee under Mr. Montague Gedge, Q.C. (Cmnd. 9112/1954).
23 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, C. 38, §§ 2(4)(a), 21(2).
24 For a full discussion of the problems involved see Baxter & Gower, Shares of No
Par Value, Incorporated Accountants Practice Note Series, No. 29 (1954).
	 .
26 The capital is the safeguard of creditors according to French and German law,
and thus must be preserved. But French law does not require that the capital be fully
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that the main duty of the corporation is to maintain its full capital so
as to enable creditors to rely upon this capital when dealing with the
corporation." It is submitted, however, that the existence of the French
action de jouissance, resulting from the amortisation of the share,
destroys this argument.
Whichever form the transfer of shares may take, be it negotiation,
assignment or some special form of transfer, it is most likely that a
contract will underlie the change in ownership. 27
 In view of the fact that
we are dealing here with foreign shares, there will arise questions of
the choice of law in relation to such transfer. Thus, let us assume that
the shares of a foreign corporation are available for purchase. Three
questions arise for consideration; what law governs (1) the validity of
the shares, proper issue, etc., (2) the rights and duties of an issuer
with respect to the registration or acknowledgement of the transfer and
(3) the contract to transfer between the parties.
Considering the last question first, what law governs the validity
of the contract to transfer? 28 The Uniform Commercial Code makes a
clear departure from existing commercial law in tackling the problem
of the choice of law rule. The Code confers upon the parties a freedom
of choice of law, provided that the law chosen has some reasonable con-
tact with the transaction. "Failing such agreement this Act applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state!'" In this re-
spect the Code comes very close to the approach advocated by Profes-
sor Cheshire" in England, that the law governing a contract shall be
the "proper law" of the contract," i.e., that law which is at the center
of gravity to the contract." Although originally rigid rules such as the
lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis, have been applied by continen-
paid up at once, since only actions (rapport (contribution shares) must be paid up in full
before the stock company comes into existence. Only one quarter of the cash shares
(actions de numiraire) need be paid up when the company comes into existence; all must
be paid up by the end of five years. Act of July 24, 1867, Arts. 1, 3 and 24. In German
law the corporation acquires Rechtsfaehigkeit (capacity) by entry into the Handelsregister.
Before such entry is possible all shares must have been subscribed. See further Baumbach
& Hueck: AktG. 52.
26 The repurchase of French shares, i.e., amortisation, can be made from capital or
from profits or reserves. If out of profits or reserve, no difficulty exists since the capital is
kept intact. What is the status of such repurchased shares? See Escarra, Droit Commercial
(1952). They can be resold but should not be kept too long. Where the repurchase is out
of capital, there is a reduction of capital and, unless special procedures are followed, the
repurchase is void.
27 It is unlikely that in a commercial transaction a gift would be involved. Thus that
form of transfer is not considered' in relation to the choice of law problem.
28 See Dicey, Conflict of Laws (7th ed. 1958) ; Cheshire, Private International Law
(5th ed. 1957); Ehren2weig, Conflict of Laws, ch. 6 (1962).
29 UCC § 1-105 (1).
30 .0p. cit. supra note 28.
31 Id. at 213-30.
82
 Graveson, The Proper Law of Commercial Contracts as Developed in the English
Legal System, Lectures on the Conflict of Laws and International Contracts (1949).
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tal-European courts, freedom to choose the applicable law was subse-
quently recognized. 33
 This led to the application of the lex validitatis,84
so that "whenever the court's choice is between the assumption of an
invalidating and a validating rule, it will assume the latter."" This
choice of law question may be further confused by the doctrine of the
"Vorfrage,"" i.e., should an incidental question be governed by the
same conflict of laws rule as that applicable to the main issue?"
In the problem we are considering, it can be argued that the main
or principal question is the transfer of shares, and that the contract to
transfer is merely incidental to this issue. The controversy is between
the choice of law rule applicable to the contract and that applicable to
the transfer of shares. Martin Wolff" advocates that the law governing
the main issue be applied to the incidental question (the "Vorfrage")
in the interest of harmony between the decisions of the forum and those
of other foreign courts whose systems of law may be involved." On
the other hand, Leo Raape" considers that this would be buying inter-
national harmony at the price of internal dissonance.'" Authority exists
in favour of both views." It is submitted that the answer lies some-
where between the two positions, resulting in the application of that
rule which will effectuate the intention of the parties.'
38 Meijers, L'histoire des principes fondamentaux du DIP a partir du moyen age, 49
Recueil des Cours 547 (1934); Savigny, The Conflict of Laws (2d ed. rev., Guthrie's
translation 1880) ; Rebel, 2 The Conflict of Laws, A Comparative Study (2d ed. 1960).
a4 For a discussion of this concept see Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 28, at 464-90.
35 Id. at 465.
3° Melchior, Die Grundlangen des Deutschen Internationalen Privatrechts (1932);
Wolff, Private International Law (2d ed. 1950); Robertson, Characterization in the
Conflict of Laws (1940).
37 Melchior, op. cit. supra note 36, cites the following example of a situation giving
rise to this problem: In an action concerning the marital relationship between a man and
a woman the existence of the marriage between them is in issue—without the marriage
there can be no such relationship. This issue is thus part of the principal question (Haupt-
frage). Should the issue be the relationship of a child to the father, the existence of the
marriage of the parents is no longer the principal question, but is a preliminary or
incidental question (Vorfrage).
88 Op. cit. supra note 36, at 208.
3° Exceptions to this approach are admitted by Robertson, op. cit. supra note 36,
"in the interest of justice." See also Wengler, Die Vorfrage im Kolisionsrecht, 8 Zausl.
P.R. 148 (1934).
40 Raape, Les Rapports Juridiques Entre Parents et Enfants, 4 Recueil des Cours
401 (1934); see also Staudinger, Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch (9th ed.
Raape 1931).
41 Cf. Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 28, and Breslauer, Private International Law of
Succession (1938) ; Gotlieh, The Incidental Question in Anglo-American Conflict of Laws,
. 33 Can. Bar Rev. 523 (1955).
42 Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, 6 Vend. L. Rev. 489
(1953); compare Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267
U.S. 22 (1925) and Berg v. Oriental Consol. Mining Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
with Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank, 306 Mass. 588, 29 N.E.2d 19 (1940).
43 Guttman, Whither Legitimacy: An Investigation of the Choice Rules to Deter-
mine the Status of Legitimacy, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 764 (1960). Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra
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The Uniform Commercial Code provides a rather simple solution
to one situation in which the problems created by the Vorfrage may
arise. In connection with the duties of an authenticating trustee, trans-
fer agent or registrar, the question is raised whether the liability of
these agents is governed by the law indicated by the conflicts rule
applicable to the transaction, or whether their liability should be gov-
erned by the lex actus, i.e. the substantive law provisions of the Code.
An argument has been advanced' that since Section 8-406 imposes
upon these agents "the same rights and privileges as the issuer", their
obligations are governed by the law determinative of the obligations
of the issuer. Section 8-406 does not contain a choice of law rule. It
provides that the duties of an authenticating trustee, transfer agent
or registrar are those imposed upon the issuer." In this way the
search for a choice of law rule is obviated and the question of a Vor-
frage does not arise. The court will have to determine, not the law
applicable to the duties of such agents, but the nature of the duty on
the issuer and then demand a like performance from the agent.43°
Considering the first question, Section 8-106 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides a conflicts rule applicable in the securities field.
Thus, the validity of the security and the rights and duties of the issuer
with relation to a transfer "are governed by the law (including the
conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction of organization of the
issuer.""
There appears to be no doubt that the validity of the security will
note 28, at 418, submits that the lex validitatis would have to have applicability. The
case of Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank, supra note 42, at 590, 29 N.E.2d at 20, seems to
support this position. In that case, two Massachusetts domiciliary-residents were travel-
ling in Italy, when one handed a sealed envelope to the other as a gift. The envelope
contained shares in a Massachusetts corporation. When the donor died, the administrator
attempted to invalidate the gift under the law of Italy, the place of transfer. The court
applied Massachusetts law for "that which was done in Italy would have been sufficient,
if it had been done in Massachusetts." I.e., the law of the issuer was allowed to govern
the mode of transfer, the actual handing over being merely incidental to the transfer.
43a Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210 (1963).
See UCC Annots., section 8-406, infra p. 610.
48b Ibid. The transfer agent had raised this argument in order to have the court
apply the law of Delaware to its obligations as agents. Since the Code has not yet been
enacted in Delaware, the agent argued that it was at most guilty of a mere nonfeasance
for which it could not be sued under Delaware law.
oc By adopting this approach, the Code prevents the defence that an agent, though
liable for a misfeasance and a malfeasance, is not liable for a nonfeasance. Heuser v.
Reilly, 128 N.J.L. 533, 27 A.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd 129 N.J.L. 388, 30 A.2d 27
(E. & A. 1943). This distinction in the law of agency is most irrational. It is difficult
to see why a holder should have to prove malice before he can succeed in an action
against the agent of an issuer. Also, when we look at the refusal to act from the point
of view of the issuer, we find great difficulty to discern therein a "mere" nonfeasance
as opposed to an active refusal. The distinction is thus not only irrational but also an
artificial distinction.
44 UCC § 8-106. For a recent case, see Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, supra
note 43a.
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have to be governed by the law of the organisation of the issuer. It is
that law which gives legal status to the issuer and as such governs its
ability to issue securities." In this connection no different approach
exists in the English, the German or the French laws.
When we come to regard the second question, i.e., the rights and
duties of an issuer with respect to the registration of the transfer, it
once again becomes appropriate to refer to the law of incorporation.
Two approaches can be discerned in the United States. The first con-
siders the law of the place of transfer to be controlling," while the
second requires conformity with the law of the place of organisation.'
Whichever approach may be adopted, it will be the law of the state of
incorporation which will determine the choice of law rule applicable to
the registration of transfers." The Code achieves this effect by provid-
ing one choice of law applicable to all investment securities." But al-
though the lex loci actus governs the negotiation of securities," the
seller has to assist the buyer to obtain registration as a shareholder in
accordance with the law of incorporation of the issuer.'
German law provides that as to a German commercial joint-stock
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), it is the articles of association which
will govern the transferability of the shares and the general contents of
the shareholders' rights. But in order to "legitimate" his rights to
membership, the claimant will have to comply with German law."
Although the transfer of bearer shares is governed by the lex loci
actus," the transfer of nominal shares is always controlled by German
45 Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 131 (1955).
4° Direction der Disconto Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., supra note 42.
47 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 184 (1934); Uniform Act for Simplification of
Fiduciary Security Transfers, § 8; Seymore v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir.
1939); Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank, supra note 42.
48 Ibid.
Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries Stock Transfer, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 843, 869
(1958).
5° UCC § 8-401.
al UCC § 8-316.
52 As to nominal shares, AktG. § 62 Abs. 3 provides: "As regards the Aktienge-
sellschaft, only those who are entered on the register are shareholders." This fiction exists
only in favour of the corporation. R.G. Bd. 86, S. 160. (A dispute exists as to this con-
clusion by the court.) Although an entry in the register is not necessary to acquire
ownership, the entry will effect the "Legitimierung" of the shareholder, i.e., it will estab-
lish his right as a shareholder vis-a-vis the corporation. The corporation will have to
check the apparent regularity of indorsements and declaration of transfer, but need not
check the genuineness of the signatures. The entry is not creative of legal rights, how-
ever, and cannot make an improperly entered person a shareholder. Error can be remedied
(R.G. Bd. 123, S. 282) not by the corporation unilaterally, but only with the consent
of the true shareholder. Until removed from the register, the person entered on it can
exercise shareholders' rights. As to bearer shares, possession suffices to "legitimise" the
possessor, B.G.B., § 793, provided the corporation cannot prove that the possessor is not
entitled to the bearer share. See also AktG. § 66.
58 AktG. § 62.
54 It. G. Seuff A. 88, S. 194.
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law; so that even though a transfer by indorsement and delivery may
not be recognised by the lex loci actus, it will be effective under Ger-
man law."
In recognition of the need to comply with the law of the state of
incorporation of the issuer, the Uniform Commercial Code provides
that reference be made not only to the corporation law of that jurisdic-
tion, but also to its "conflict of laws rule." This is a clear reference to
the admission of a renvoi. A reference either back or forward to the law
of the transaction would thus have to be accepted." So far, the ap-
proach of the American courts has been to ignore the conflicts rules in
the law to which their choice of law rules have referred them," while in
England the theory of the total renvoi has had a considerable vogue."
It submitted that a renvoi is here required so as to enable the de cuius
to realize his expectations. Certain rights, such as rights in lands situate
in the jurisdiction of a foreign legal system and rights of shareholders
to participate in a corporation, will be protected only by a renvoi. Only
by considering the totality of the foreign law will it be possible to
determine the rights of the holder of a security. To enforce the rights
of the holder it may be necessary to proceed ultimately against the
assets of the issuer. Generally, they will be found in the place of organ-
isation and governed by that law." A full determination of these rights
in the forum will prevent the unnecessary expenditure involved in an
attempt to enforce rights not recognised by the foreign state."
II
The approach to share certificates as embodying a chose in action
has not been carried by English law to its ultimate conclusion so as to
make the certificate a negotiable instrument as under German law.
Only share warrants, issued when shares are fully paid up" and after
exacting revenue requirements" are satisfied, are deemed bearer securi-
Wuerdinger, op. cit. supra note 16; see also E.G.B.G.B. § 30.
56 For an interesting discussion of the problem involved see Ehrenzweig, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 334 et seq.; Compare, Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine, 27 Yale L.J.
509 (1918) with Cowan, Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev.
34 (1938).
57 In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919); see how-
ever, In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, aff'd on rehearing, 100
N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950). For the facts, see 298 N.Y. 532, 80 N.E.2d 667 (1948),
where the court applied the "total" renvoi theory.
58 In re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch. 506, aff'd, [19481 Ch. 118 (CA.) ; see
also Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 28.
59 Cf. Latty, op. cit. supra note 45.
69 Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws (Tent. Draft No. 5 1959).
61 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 H 83, 112. The articles of association
must permit the issue of such share warrants. See also Rules of the London Stock Ex-
change, Appendix 34, 197 (Schedule 8, Part 1) requiring the prompt issue of warrants
and certification of transfer to obtain quotation on the Exchange.
92 The share warrants must be stamped three times the amount of transfer duty,
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ties. Due to difficulties in communication between the corporation and
the holders of such warrants, these share warrants were never very
popular." This unpopularity has been increased by the Exchange
Control Act of 1947, 64 which added further restrictions to the issue of
share warrants." These restrictions were enacted to preserve the sta-
bility of the pound sterling. They not only have brought about the con-
trol of the issuance of share warrants, but they also require all bearer
securities to be deposited in special deposit accounts.°° Dividends, if
any, are paid into these accounts.'
On the continent of Europe, however, the bearer share has long
been the primary form of corporate stock, provided: (1) that the
articles of association (Satzung) allow them; (2) that the share is fully
paid up; and (3) that it is not subject to any additional burden." A
bearer share is transferable by agreement and delivery." It is usual for
such shares to be deposited with banks for safekeeping since loss
enables a finder to acquire and hold title to the certificate until the
corporation brings an action to disprove his right to the share." Deposit
i.e., 6%; Stamp Act, 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 39, 1st Schedule, and Finance Act, 10 & 11
Geo. 6, c. 35 H 52 (1), (2).
63 The Report of the Committee on Transfer of Shares, The Stock Exchange, Lon-
don, England, 	 68, 69 (Dec. 1960) under the Chairmanship of Lord Ritchie indicates:
Thirdly, Bearer is not acceptable to the average investor in this country, the
main objection being the liability of the title document to loss or destruction.
. . . (69) The interest of the United Kingdom investor is in our view of para-
mount importance and we do not consider that the time is ripe for asking him
to accept Bearer security. However we believe there may be a case for the
wider use of Bearer security especially for Government Stocks and for companies
whose shares are dealt with extensively in foreign markets.
The suggestion of this committee is the creation of "as nearly as possible a hybrid of
Bearer and Registered Share."
64 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14.
66 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14, §§ 10, 11. Thus, there must be Treasury permission to the
issue of share warrants; it is only rarely granted.
66 But only if situated in the United Kingdom or held on behalf of a United King-
dom resident. Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14, §§ 15, 16. Exchange
Control (Authorised Depositories) (No. 2) Order, 1954 (St 1636 of 1954) as amended.
67 Ibid.
68 Baumbach-Hueck, AktG. § 10; Note B.G.B. H 793 et seq. and Rehfeldt, Wert-
papierrecht (8th ed. 1959). Note that a share in an Aktiengesellschaft subject' to
Nebensleistungen (additional duties) cannot be bearer. (AktG. § 50.) This type of cor-
poration arose in the sugarbeet industry, the shareholders being under the obligation to
supply beets to the factories. Also the interim-certificates (scrip), usually issued before the
shares are fully paid up, must not be bearer, AktG. § 10 Abs. 3, or they will be void,
AktG. § 10 Abs. 2 and 4. A.G., J.W. 1927, S. 1679. Criminal liability as well as the duty
to compensate will exist. AktG. § 296 Abs. 1(3). Where the share can only be transferred
subject to the consent of the corporation it cannot be bearer. AktG. H 61 Abs. 3; 88
Abs. 2; 50 Abs. 1. A bearer share cannot be so restricted. E.G., J.W. 1939, S. 296.
6° See B.G.B., §§ 929 et seq. As to good faith, see B.G.B., § 935 and H.G.B., § 366.
The regulations applicable to banks under H.G.B., § 367 limit acquisition in good faith.
70 AktG. 66. Note that these provisions haVe nothing to do with the Wertpapier-
bereinigungsGesetz (Aug. 19, 1949), trying to trace war profits and theft of property by
Nazis. See also the Aufgebotsverfahren under § 799 Abs. 2 and B.G.B., § 800.
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with the bank confers tremendous power upon the bank since it then
will be able to exercise all the rights of the shareholders." Thus, the
power of banks in the corporate field is not to be underrated." It is
evident not only in the exercise of voting strength resultant on the
deposit, but it also is discernible in the approach of banks to corpora-
tions which in many instances are both its debtors because of loans and
its creditors because of deposits. Close ties often result through the
bank's representation on the board of directors of a corporation." One
of the difficulties of this close relationship became evident in Germany
with the advent of the Nazis' rise to power. Nationalisation of the
banks resulted in Nazi power over those corporations whose shares had
been deposited with these banks."
The favourable position held by bearer shares in Europe is mainly
due to the ease with which such shares can be transferred and, in times
of stress, moved from country to country as realisable wealth. This
became most evident during the emergencies of the refugee period
created by the Germans in 1933. The resultant Nazi laws, requiring
the deposit of Jewish-owned bearer shares in special accounts, sought to
prevent the removal of these assets from the country so that they would
be available for confiscation by the Nazis. Where such shares were not
deposited, the German administrator of Jewish property obtained a
declaration that the share was lost and, by court order, a replacement
share was issued.75
 The replacement shares would be kept in these
special accounts."
When the Red Armies entered Berlin they found a number of
bearer shares in banks, and they could have controlled German econ-
omy through the use of the powers contained therein. In addition,
claims based on expropriation were made by persons whom the
Germans had forcibly relieved of the right to control their shares. As
a result, a process of examining rights to shares was started by the
71 The rights in the share certificate are exercisable on production of a bearer share.
(Legitimierung.) See AktG. § 114 indicating that banks do not have to produce proxies
to rote these shares.
72 It is usual to deposit share certificates with banks. Banks also introduced "irregular
deposits" as a result of which certificates were treated as fungibles, the depositor being
entitled only to an equal number of share certificates, i.e., a contractual right against the
bank. Compare UCC § 8-320. Depotgesetz § 15 (Feb. 4, 1937) required such agreement
to be in writing. Note that most of the over-the-counter market is carried on by banks.
73 See Schlesinger, Comparative Law 440 (2d ed. 1959).
74 Though nationalisation occurred in 1931 when the serious bank crisis occurred in
Germany, the Nazis were not slow in siesing this opportunity to gain control of the
economy.
75 AktG. § 66.
76 See Decree of December 3, 1938 and the unfortunate result reached by the Swiss
court in Seligmann-Gans, B.G.E. Bd. 6611, S. 37 (1940) which, coupled with AktG. § 66,
enabled the Germans to make a compulsory confiscation of Jewish assets "contrary" to
Swiss public policy.
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West German Government under the Wertpapierbereinigungsgesetz."
All those who claimed shareholder rights were required to prove the
mode of acquisition of their bearer shares. Where claims were estab-
lished to the satisfaction of this law, new shares were issued. This slow
work is still in process."
In France, the German occupation and the fear of its extension
into what was known as Vichy-France, led to the large scale removal of
wealth from that country. As a result, the Vichy-Government passed
ordinances prohibiting the issue of bearer shares and demanding the
deposit of existing bearer securities in specially authorised deposi-
tories," Caine centrale de depOts et de virements de titres
(C.C.D.V.T.). The holders were required to deposit their shares in
member banks. These banks, in turn, deposited them with the
C.C.D.V.T. where accounts were kept for each bank. Transfers were
accomplished by means of account adjustments without physical
delivery of the share certificates. The compulsory nature of this form
of deposit account for bearer securities made the C.C.D.V.T. very un-.
popular," and led to its abolition in 1949. 81 The ease and speed with
which transfers of shares were made possible by this central depository
system led to the introduction of a voluntary organisation, Sociatg
interprofessionelle pour la compensation des valeurs mobilieres
(Sicovam).' The mechanical convenience of the earlier system was
preserved without the feature of compulsion. It should be noted, how-
ever, that some element of compulsion still exists. A shareholder who
leaves his bearer shares with an affiliated bank will have to give specific
instructions that the shares are not to be sent to Sicovam. Where such
a share has come into the hands of an affiliated bank or broker, clear
title can be given to the transferee. Thus, where the bearer share has
been stolen or lost, a notice is published in the Bulletin des Opposition,
hopefully in time for affiliated banks and brokers to be on notice not to
negotiate such share." Since a deposit with Sicovam would be a nego-
77 August 19, 1949.
78 There are no longer any restrictions on investments in Western Germany, Run-
derlasz Auszenwirtschaft Nr. 35/59.
78 Act of February 28, 1941; Act of June 18, 1941; Act of February 3, 1943. Author-
ity to issue bearer securities was again granted in 1949. Decree No. 49-1105, Art. 2, Aug.
4, 1949.
80 Being in Government controlled depositories, the revenue authorities were able
to keep a check on the transactions of these bearer securities and, thus, to demand the
payment of revenue duties. Note that the Act of July 24, 1867, as amended by Decree
of November 29, 1939, prohibits a person from representing himself as a shareholder and
to vote as such without holding a proxy. Blank proxies are deemed valid and are usually
held by banks.
81 Act of July 5, 1949, Art. 26; Decree No. 49-1105 of August 5, 1949.
82 Ibid.
88 Decree No. 49-1105, Art. 16.
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tiation and the share would lose its identification and be treated as
fungible, early notice is requisite.
In the United States, the bearer share has never found adherents.
The political situation was never such as to require this means of
facilitating the transfer of wealth. In addition, fear of loss of the certifi-
cate and the difficulties of communication between the corporation and
shareholder militated against the adoption by corporations of this form
of security. However, the possible treatment of such security is pro-
vided for by the Uniform Commercial Code in Article 8." The history
of European experimentation with bearer shares has shown that in
times of political stress, when bearer shares were counted upon to play
their part, the concomitant economic stress has led to restrictions
destroying negotiability by mere delivery.
III
Although the bearer share is the usual form of stock participation
in the French and German corporate structure, 'this form of share
certificate is subject to certain restrictions. The articles of association
(Satzung) must either permit the issue of bearer shares or, in France,
not forbid actions au porteur. 85 Only where the share has been fully
paid up can a corporation issue a certificate in this form." Also, since
bearer shares are freely transferable, they cannot be issued where some
additional activities are demanded from the shareholder,' nor where
the transfer of shares is subject to restrictions, such as the consent of
the corporate governing body." In all these circumstances, the identity
of the shareholder will be of importance to the corporation. The
corporation will keep a register of shareholders" in order to keep the
control the circumstances require."
84 UCC g 8-102.
85 Germany: AktG. § 10; Baumbach-Hueck (11th ed. 1961). Note that where doubt
exists, the share must be treated as a nominal (registered) share. AktG. § 17. France: see
Church, Business Associations Under French Law (1960); Act of August 4, 1949, Art. 2.
86 France: Act of July 24, 1867, Art. 3; Germany: AktG. § 10 Abs. 2.
87 Note the German Aktie mit Nebenspflichten. (AktG. § 50.) This is possible pro-
vided (i) the Articles contain provisions for such duties; (ii) the transfer of shares is
restricted in requiring the consent of extant members and (iii) the duty is disclosed on
the share certificate. The duty is part of the shareholder's right transferred with the share.
(R.G. Bd. 136 S. 313.)
88 France: Although it is not possible to make the transfer subject to the consent
of all shareholders [Cass. Aug. 10, 1887, 1 Dalloz 440 (1887), 1 Sirey 33 (1889)1, it is
possible to restrict the transfer so as to require the approval of the management or gen-
eral meeting to the transferee. Cass. Oct. 29, 1902; 1904 J. des Soc. 391. Germany: AktG.
§§ 61 Abs. 3; E.G. Bd. 132, S. 149; 88 Abs. 2; 50 Abs. 1. Consent can be given before
or after the transfer. E.G. Bd. 132, S. 157. It is not possible to link the consent to that
of a third party, E.G. in J.W., 1959, S. 296.
89 France: Act of July 24, 1867, Art. 21; Germany: AktG. 61.
90 E.g., to make calls, to demand performance of additional acts, to consider the
attributes of the proposed transferee, etc.
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In German law this does not mean that the nominal share
(Namensaktie) is not a negotiable instrument." It is an order paper
requiring indorsement and delivery for negotiation." There is no need
for the share certificate to indicate that it is an order paper, it is such
by its very nature." As such, the nominal share certificate is subject to
the provisions of the German Negotiable Instruments Law (Wechsel-
recht)." Although the share is negotiable by indorsement and delivery,
an informal transfer is also possible by means of a declaration of
transfer (Abtretungserklaerung) and assignment (Zession). Little use
is made of this form, however."
Although the articles of association cannot restrict the free aliena-
tion of bearer shares and cannot prevent the negotiation of nominal
share certificates, nevertheless, the exercise of membership rights is
dependent upon the transferee's name being entered into the register.
Thus there will have to be a Legitimation to show that the share has
been properly negotiated and that membership has been transferred. If
the transfer of membership is dependent upon consent of the manage-
ment" (Vinkulierung), the articles will have to be examined to deter-
mine whether management has an absolute discretion to refuse its
consent or only a limited one." An abuse of discretion is reversible.
There is no need to enter a restriction on transfer on the share certifi-
cate," as is the case under the Uniform Commercial Code." The basis
of -shareholding being the articles of association, a transferee is deemed
to have notice thereof. In all other respects the transfer of the share
certificate also transfers membership rights, for these rights follow the
ownership of the paper, into which they have become incorporated. A
corporation will have to check whether a negotiation occurred, but it is
under no obligation to check the validity of any signature.'" Nor is
91 AktG. 61 Abs. 2. It is order paper and WechselGesetz H 12, 13 & 16 are appli-
cable.
92 W.G. § 13, deals with indorsement and also indorsements in blank. R.G. Bd. 117,
S. 72. The nominal share is thus an order paper and not a Rektapapier, i.e., payable
only to X.
93 See the analysis by Rehfeldt, Wertpapierrecht (8th ed. 1959), i.e., the share
certificate need not state on its face that it is transferable by indorsement and delivery.
It is geborene order paper. See also Hueck, Recht der Wertpapiere (7th ed. 1957).
94 Supra note 92.
95 B.G.B., H 40, 952; R.G. Bd. 86, S. 157.
96 AktG. § 61 Abs. 3.
97 Ibid. R.G. Bd. 132, S. 149; R.G. Bd. 132, S. 154. Where there has been a wrongful
refusal to enter him, the transferee can demand such entry since be has become a mem-
ber by acquiring the share certificate.
98 It is effective even against a purchaser in good faith, being part of the contract
between shareholder and corporation. The consent can be given by the board of directors,
R.G. Bd. 72, S. 293, even though the articles designate some other group.
99 UCC § 8-204.
100 AktG. § 62; Baumbach-Hueck, op. cit. supra note 85.
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there an obligation on the corporation to enter a person on the share
register if his right to the share can be disproved.
Finally it must be noted here, that it is possible to obtain the
advantages of a bearer share certificate by indorsing the nominal share
certificate in blank. An indorsement in blank will enable the negotiation
of the share certificate, although the holder will not be able to exercise
membership rights until he obtains entry into the register. Until that
time, the person whose name is on the register will remain liable to
perform any acts required of members."' This becomes of especial
importance in connection with the Nebensleistungsaktie, a share which
requires additional acts from its holder throughout the life of the
corporation. This type of corporation has its origin in the sugar-beet
industry and requires that members annually supply beets to the mill
for processing. 102
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the registered share is also
considered a negotiable instrument,' 03 transferable by indorsement and
delivery!" A bona fide purchaser will take free from equities.'" The
question whether an indorsement is required to negotiate the share is
determined by the form in which the share has been issued, since the
Code here rejects the common law rule of "once a bearer instrument,
always a bearer instrument.'"" An indorsement in blank, however, will
have the effect of permitting the share to be negotiated by delivery until
shareholder rights are sought to be exercised. Then entry into the
register is needed and the corporation will issue a new registered share
to the holder.' Where the transfer is not by negotiation, it will be
possible to achieve the same result through the so-called shelter provi-
sion of Section 8-301(1). 1"
An important distinction from German law is in the obligation of
the corporation with respect to signatures. The Code grants no protec-
tion in the case of an unauthorised signature."' The application for
101 E.g., calls as well as demands for the Nebensleistung will have to be addressed
to that person. AktG. § 62 Abs. 3.
102 Godin & Wilhelmi, Aktiengesetz (2d ed. 1950) ; AktG. § 50.
103 UCC 	 8-105; see further Guttman, Investment Securities under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1961).
1" UCC 8-307.
105 UCC 8-301(2). The UCC refers to these as "adverse claims" [UCC § 8-301(1)].
Thus, note the importance of the notice provisions in UCC §§ 8-103, 8-204 Sr 8-304.
108 The Code requires that the instrument be originally issued to bearer before that
rule is applicable. But note that an indorsement on a security in bearer form may give
notice of an adverse claim (UCC §§ 8-310 & 8-304).
1 " UCC 	 8-308(2). The Code here resolves a difficulty of interpretation which
existed under the NIL in relation to NIL § 40 and NIL §§ 9(5), 34. Usually a registered
share will be returned to the corporation which will issue a new certificate. Note the
use of clearing houses, however, where the shares would be held in street names or
indorsed in blank. UCC § 8-320.
108 UCC 8-301(1).
108 UCC 	 8-311 refers to unauthorised indorsements. For the effect of an unau-
506
CORPORATE STOCK TRANSFERS
membership will have to be accompanied by a suitable assurance that
the signatures on the application to transfer the share are genuine, and
that the person who signed had appropriate authority. There is no need
to investigate the validity of the transfer and thus an indorsement guar-
antee cannot be demanded.'" What can be requested is an assurance
that the signature is that of an appropriate person, having the proper
incumbency, to sign the transfer." What is such appropriate evidence
of incumbency is indicated in the Code. 12
With respect to signatures, the purchaser of the security is asked
to produce a warranty that the signature is valid. If he be a purchaser
for value without notice of adverse claims his warranty would merely
indicate that he has no knowledge of any defect in the authority of
signatories."' The power of an owner to attack the validity of relevant
signatures is, however, subject to some restrictions among which are
estoppel, contributory negligence and ratification.'" The Code in
allowing ratification avoids the difficulties which are caused by drawing
a distinction between forgery and an unauthorized signature. It is no
longer necessary to investigate the existence of fraudulent purposes. By
protecting the bona fide purchaser, provided he has received a new, re-
issued or reregistered security from a broker, or has himself sent his
transfer to the corporation and in return received such security in good
faith, the Code recognizes that the purchaser may not be aware of any
restrictive indorsements that may have appeared thereon. The issuer
would remain liable however"' and would have to protect himself by
demanding a signature guarantee."' He will also have a right against
the unauthorised signatory.'"
This approach would appear to make those provisions, which
tborised signature on issue, see UCC	 8-205. The term "unauthorised" is defined in
UCC § 1-201(43) as being without "actual, implied or apparent authority and includes
a forgery."
110 UCC § 8-312(2).
111 UCC § 8-312(1) and 8-308.
112 UGC § 8-402(3).
115 UCC § 8-306.
114 UCC § 8-4050) sets out an instance of contributory negligence in requiring that
an owner who has lost his security must notify the issuer within a reasonable time or he
will be precluded from setting up his right under UCC § 8-311, where the issuer has
registered a transfer prior to receiving such notice.
115 UCC §§ 8-311(b), 8-404. The owner, if he is not precluded by estoppel, con-
tributory negligence or ratification, will be able to recover a similar security or, at least,
damages (UCC § 8-104).
116 UCC § 8-312.
111 Hawkland, Commercial Paper 33 (1959) states: "[Slurely no social policy is
violated in making a forger or unauthorised agent personally liable on the instrument.
The liability of the forger may not be worth much, but that is no reason not to impose it.
The liability of an unauthorised agent may be worth a great deal . . . ." This was
written in relation to UCC § 3-4040) and no equivalent provision exists in Article 8,
but the suggestion is a sound one. Note Official Comment 2 to UCC § 8-104.
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require that restrictions be indorsed on the instrument, of little effect's
The rule of notification by indorsement on the security is further cut
back by the power granted in Section 8-107, under which a security is
treated as a fungible. Thus, delivery can be completed by handing over
any form of security be it bearer, registered in the name of the trans-
feree or indorsed in blank, unless there is an agreement requiring a
specific form.'" This links closely with the right of the buyer from a
broker to be handed a "clean" security, i.e., one free from all adverse
claims.'s° But the protection of the issuer is further lost, as is that of
any subsequent holder wishing to enter on this share a restriction indi-
cating his adverse claim,'" by the use of the clearing house.'"
Free transferability is best achieved by having the security in
bearer form or indorsed in blank or "street" name, thereby achieving
the same result as if it were a bearer security.'" Thus in many in-
stances shares are kept in clearing houses through which the brokers
transact their business. Only when the client desires to receive the
actual share certificates would there be any actual physical transfer and
then, of course, a share subject to adverse claims could be rejected.'"
The whole transaction is carried out on the books of the clearing house
in the same manner as financial transactions may be carried out be-
tween banks,' i.e., a balancing of accounts. The closest continental
118
 Note here also the provisions of UCC § 8-320, as a result of this means of
transacting transfers of shares, the actual certificate may never be seen and thus no
notice of adverse claims be given to the purchaser.
119
 In English law, a vendor who contracts to sell registered shares, cannot complete
by delivering share warrants. Iredell v. General Sec. Corp. (1916) 33 T.L.R. 67 (CA.).
129
 UCC 8-313 which rejects the decision in Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E.
1084 (1894). In its amended form UCC § 8-313(3) protects the broker where he received
the notice of adverse claims after he had taken delivery as holder for value. The purchaser
may, however, demand a security free from all adverse claims, unless he be estopped from
doing so. UCC § 1-103. The New York Stock Exchange objects to the right of the
customer to demand such "clean" security. See further Israel's How to Handle Transfers
of Stock, Bonds and Other Investment Securities, Bus. Law. 90, 99-101 (Nov. 1963).
121 UCC 8-304 and see H 8-103, 8-204.
122 UCC 8-320.
123
 Note the criticism of placing securities in street name. Report of the Committee
on Transfer of Securities (Dec. 1960), The Stock Exchange, London, England, II 43
[Me consider that this system does not save labour but rather increases it. The
duties of the company pass to the "names" who are called upon to perform the
tasks of recording the transfer of shares, the distribution of dividends and cap-
italisation issues, applications for rights issues or other offers and other tasks
which normally fall on the company. We believe this system would raise difficul-
ties as to the legal relationship of the "name" to the owner of the shares. We
also consider that there would be objections to this method from those who,
for various reasons, dislike increasing the anonymity of shareholders.
129 UCC § 8-313. Note further the American Depositary Receipt, where the basic
foreign security is most likely not even in the United States, but in the foreign country
in an authorised depository. In my submission, however, the A.D.R. is the security traded
here and not the foreign one underlying it.
125
 Article 4 of the Code may become a guideline here.
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equivalent is the Sicovam of France, which also treats negotiable, bearer
securities as fungibles and provides for.their transfer on the books kept
by this institution. If the share certificate is never seen, little effect can
be given to an indorsement. Generally clearing houses will not accept
shares subject to adverse claims, for although they are entitled to
return the shares to the broker if they are rejected by a purchaser,'
this is not of much assistance where shares are treated as fungibles by
the clearing house so that it is not possible to determine their origin.
Although the duty to register a transfer is stated in mandatory
terms," this duty is subject to the overriding obligation of good
faith." It must, however, not be forgotten that the purpose of the
Uniform Commercial Code is to prevent the excessive documentation
previously demanded by transfer agents and corporations." Thus once
the formal requirements of the transfer are satisfied, the transfer can
be compelled.' In return the corporation is granted immunity from
liability from anyone affected by such transfer."'
IV
Neither French nor English law appears to treat the nominal
registered share as a negotiable instrument, though they do strive for
that effect. French law permits some restrictions to be placed on the
transfer of nominal shares," but it forbids an absolute prohibition on
transfer."' Any restriction will be narrowly construed."' Ownership of
the shares is based on a declaration of transfer, signed by the trans-
feror or his agent,' entered in the register. The effect of a transfer,
once properly constituted on the books of the corporation, is that the
new holder has title to the share, if acquired in good faith. Such title
128 See the New York Stock Exchange Rules 265-75, as well as those of the Wash-
ington-Baltimore and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges. Another problem exists where the
broker obtained the security from another customer. Here, too, he would not have a chance
of returning it. It is submitted that the new provisions in UCC § 8-113 are preferable to
what used to be the law. A customer is not under the rule "know your client", as a
broker is, nor is he in a position to see that he does not get a tainted security, something
against which the broker can much better protect himself. Whether UCC § 8-313 will
remain the rough spot for New York brokers in the light of UCC § 8-320 will have to
be seen. To date, New York has not agreed to amend the emasculated provision of UCC
§ 8-313 enacted in that state.
122 UCC § 8-401 .
128 uc § 1-203. This becomes most important in relation to UCC § 8-402(4).
122 That is, under the Taney doctrine, Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15
Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848). See effect in Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 33, 34 (1957) as to resultant costs.
199 UCC § 8-401, or at least damages can be recovered under UCC § 8-104. See
further Guttman, op. cit. supra note 103, at 39.
131 UCC § 8-404.
132 Cass. Mar. 27, 1878; 1 Sirey 277 (1878).
133 Cass. August 10, 1887; 1 Dalloz 440 (1887); 1 Sirey 33 (1889).
184 Cass. January 2, 1924; 1925 J. des Soc. 83.
135 Code de Commerce, Art. 36; Act of July 24, 1867, Art. 21.
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cannot be attacked; not even by the true owner, who will have to move
against the thief, forger or the corporation when he has been wrongfully
deprived of the share.' In this connection the importance of the
Bulletin des Opposition should be noted. Through it, brokers and others
may be given notice of objections to any intended dealings with the
shares. 87 Where proper notice has been given, it is not possible later
to plead a "white heart, empty head" defence."' This conclusion is also
reached by the Uniform Commercial Code, but it fails, however, to
provide a uniform method of notification!"
Where the transferor deals directly with the corporation and not
through a stockbroker (transfert rêels)," ° the demand to transfer must
be in the form prescribed. This requires that the transferor have his
signature verified unless he personally appears at the offices of the
corporation."' The receipt of an application to transfer must state that
the shares have accompanied the application and must indicate when
the securities will be available to the transferee."' Notice of any op-
position to the transfer must be given by the corporation to the appli-
cant within ten days. Otherwise a provisional indorsement of non-
opposition must be sent (visa provisoire de non-opposition) 148 The
transfer may thus be completed within eleven days of the demand."'
Where the transfer is made through stockbrokers, French law is
unnecessarily complicated. In such a case, there must be two transfers,
one from the selling stockbroker to the buying stockbroker and a
further one to the buyer. One step can be avoided if the buying stock-
broker promptly informs the corporation that he is merely a broker. In
that case, he will not be entered on the books of the corporation and,
thus, he will not be liable should the shares still be subject to any out-
standing calls."' This circuity can also be avoided where one stock-
broker acts on behalf of both the seller and the buyer."' The greatest
188 Cass. October 31, 1900; 1901 J. des Soc. 547.
181 Decree No. 49-1105 of August 4, 1949, Art. 16.
188 Graham v. White-Phillips, 296 U.S. 27 (1935).
188 UCC 8-4050) merely requires notice but does not indicate the form it is to
take. UCC § 1-201(26) would thus apply. UCC § 8-403(3)(a) requires notice in writing
but does not require the matters set out in UCC § 8-403(1) (a).
148 Decree of October 25, 1934.
141 Id. at Art. 7.
142 Decree of October 26, 1934, Art. 12.
148 Id. at Art. 14; (Decree of October 25, 1934, Art. 8).
144 Id. at Art. 12. Delay entitles the holder to damages.
148 See Decree of October 25, 1934, Arts. 2-4; Decree of October 25, 1934, Arts. 2, 7.
Note the analysis of the transfers under the UCC by Guttman, Investment Securities
under the U.C.C., 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1961) and Israels, 1954(2) N.Y.L. Rev.
Com . Rep. (UCC) 897.
148 This would only take eight days. The transfer would be much quicker where
the security can be converted into bearer security, for here the selling broker applies to
have the security converted and then hands it over to the buying broker or buyer. It can
then be reconverted into nominal security.
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objection to these repeated transfers is the time lost before the transfer
is completed. For if approval of the new member is required by the
articles of association, it may take up to fifteen days even though only
one stockbroker is involved 1 47
It is also possible for nominal shares to be attached by creditors
prior to a transfer. This is done by serving notice on the corporation
forbidding it to pay either dividends or to amortise the share.'" The
court will then be asked to order the sale of the share. If the debtor
refuses to deliver the share certificate, the creditor can obtain a court
order requiring the corporation to strike the name of the shareholder
and to deliver a new share, to be sold in execution of the attachment')
It is submitted that the method of transfer adopted in France indicates
that the share certificate is not a negotiable instrument, but that to it
are attached some rights similar to negotiability, provided the proper
formalities for transfer have been followed.
Restrictions on transfer are well known to English corporation
law. Thus all "Private Companies" must expressly restrict the transfer
of shares so as to limit the shareholders to the number permitted."'
Also, in the exempt private company, this restrictive power has to be
incorporated into the articles of association so as to prevent other cor-
porations from purchasing its stock, thereby causing it to lose the ad-
vantages exemption confers."' In this respect, the English approach
is different from the restrictions contained in the articles of a closely-
held American corporation. Such closely-held corporations, how-
147 Decree of October 25, 1934, Arts. 3-5; Decree of October 26, 1934, Arts. 3, 7, 8.
Note that this time is still shorter than that elapsing in England, where a company has
two months to notify its refusal to the transferee. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38, § 78. The Jenkins Committee, Cmnd. 1749/62, § 476, proposes that the time be
cut to five weeks. In the United States a much shorter time applies, usually four days.
148 Amortisation here is affected out of company assets, excluding the capital. There
must be specific authority in the articles permitting amortisation. Once amortised, the
share certificate is changed to indicate this (action de jouissance), but the shareholder's
rights are not affected thereby, with the exception that, on liquidation, he does not have
a claim to the capital since he has already received his share of it.
149 Church, Business Associations Under French Law, § 255 (1960).
188 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 280) sets out the three require-
ments for a company to be a private company: (a) membership must be limited to fifty
persons excluding employees and ex-employees who became members while in the em-
ployment of the company; (b) restrictions on the transfer of shares must exist; and
(c)• no invitation must be made to the public to subscribe to shares or debentures.
151 It is, however, difficult to prevent a loss of exemption from the requirements
of publishing financial statements and those prohibiting loans to directors, since exemption
depends not on the provisions of the articles or memorandum, but on the de facto posi-
tion of members, debenture holders and directors. As to the requirements to be fulfilled
for a company to claim to he an exempt private company, see Companies Act, 1948, supra
note 150, § 129 and Schedule 7. A provision similar to Table A, Part II, Article 6 may
help. Note that the Jenkins Committee, supra note 147 recommended the abolition of
the distinction between public, private and exempt private companies with some con-
cession as to publication of accounts, etc., by companies whose shares are not quoted on
the stock exchange.
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ever, must give notice of the restriction on transfer by indorsement on
the share certificate. Otherwise, a purchaser may be able to claim that
he had properly acquired the share without notice of the restriction.'"
In this connection a further restriction becomes important. Namely,
shares, which have not been registered under the 1933 Securities Act,
will have to carry due notice to this effect so as to prevent any transfer
violative of this Act. 163 English law does not control the issue of shares
in this manner, leaving instead the policing of the issues to the stock
exchange and to the private industry involved in the dealing with
shares. Some control, however, does exist,'" though with the exception
of the emergency legislation under the 1947 Exchange Control Act,'"
it has no effect on the transfer of shares already issued.
One of the first differences we can note between the English ap-
proach and that under the Uniform Commercial Code is the absence of
any Statute of Frauds provision in English law applicable to the
transfer of shares. English law allows an oral contract for the sale of
shares, and will specifically enforce such oral contract, even though
nothing has been paid thereunder.'" The basis of the divergence of the
English and the American approach to this matter is the unfortunate
existence of decisions like Greenwood v. Law,'" where Judge Van
Sykel found that Lord Denman in Humble v. Mitchell,' had over-
looked two decisions's° applying the Statute of Frauds's° to a contract
for the sale of shares. A realisation that shares are choses in action and
not goods 10 ' would have released this type of commercial transaction
from an unnecessary hindrance. Doubt remained in this country even at
the beginning of the twentieth century and was resolved only by the
extension of the Statute of Frauds provision in the Uniform Sales Act
to choses in action.'" The Statute of Frauds, in so far as it had been
162 UCC 4 8-204. Note that restrictions on transfer cannot be absolute. Tracey v.
Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (1949). A right of first refusal to the corporation
or other shareholders is generally permitted. Baumuhl v. Goldstein 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124
Atl. 118 (1924). See further O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held
Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
168 Lsraels, Stop-Transfer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933—Addendum to
Uniform Commercial Code—Article 8, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 158 (1962).
164 Note the Capital Issues Committee set up under the Borrowing (Control and
Guarantees) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 58 and the Control of Borrowing Order, 1958,
S.I. 1958, No. 1208, made thereunder, requiring Treasury consent to issues of more than
£50,000 within any period of twelve months. Of further note is the Prevention of Fraud
(Investment) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45.
156 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14.
156 Cheale v. Kenward (1858) 3 De G. & J. 27.
tar 55 N.J.L. 168, 26 AU. 134 (1893).
168 11 Ad. & El. 205, 113 Eng. Rep. 392 (1840).
162 Crull v. Dodson, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 51, Sel. Cas. T. King 41, 22 Eng. Rep. 44,
25 Eng. Rep. 211 (1725) and Mussell v. Cooke, Prec. Ch. 533, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 49, 70,
22 Eng. Rep. 43, 62, 24 Eng. Rep. 239 (1720).
to 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677).
161 See Humble v. Mitchell, supra note 158.
182 Uniform Sales Act 4 4.
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retained as applicable to the sale of goods, has been rejected in
England. 168 In this country, however, the Uniform Commercial Code
continues this anachronism' and, unfortunately, still embodies its
requirements in relation to shares, albeit in a somewhat ameliorated
manner. 165
In order to transfer shares in an English company, an instru-
ment of transfer must be executed."' This is normally a separate
instrument and not indorsed on the share certificate itself, as is the case
in the United States."' The form of the transfer is determined by the
articles of association."' Only when the transfer is filed with it will the
company have to transfer membership. Generally, both the transferor
and the transferee must execute the transfer. But once the transferor
has completed this requirement, he is free of any other obligation. He
makes no warrant that the company will transfer the share into the
name of the transferee. 169 The duty to obtain registration is on the
transferee."° Until the transfer is completed, i.e., until the transferee
has been entered on the register as member,'" the transferor remains
a member of the company and is liable on the share.' However, unless
163 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34.
104 UCC §§ 1-206, 2-201, 8-319.
165 See further Guttman, Investment Securities Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 18-21 (1961).
165 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 75. This document is demanded to pre-
vent evasion of Revenue, i.e., the 2% stamp duty required on transfers. Stamp Act, 1891,
54 & 55 Vict., c. 39, § 17; see also Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, 10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 6,
c. 85, as amended by Finance Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 35.
167 In England, a separate instrument is used since this is found more convenient.
See Report of the Committee on Transfer of Securities, Stock Exchange, London, Dec.
1960, vi 33, 34.
168 Generally the articles simply state that the transfer can be in any "usual or
common form," Companies Act, 1948, First Schedule, Table A, Part I, Art. 23; Re
Letheby & Christopher, Ltd. (1904] 1 Ch. 815. The articles may, of course, impose re-
strictions on transfer, Weston's Case (1868) 4 Ch. App. 20. Note, however, further the
Exchange Control Act, 1947, supra note 155, which has to be complied with as well.
No difficulty arises where both the transferor and the transferee reside in the sterling area
and are beneficially entitled to the security. See Exchange Control (Declaration and Evi-
dence) Order, 1954, S.I. 1635. If either party is not so resident, Treasury consent is
required to the transfer. A transfer in contravention of the Exchange Control Act makes
all participating parties guilty of an offence under the Act. Note, however, sections 9
and 13 which enable innocent parties to gain relief.
169 London Founder's Ass'n v. Clarke, 20 Q.B.D. 576 (CA. 1888). But he must not
do anything which might prevent registration of the transferee, Hooper v. Herts, [19061
1 Ch. 549 (C.A.).
179 Neilson v. James, 9 Q.B.D. 546 (C.A. 1882).
171 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 26(2). The register is prima fade evi-
dence of both the fact of membership and the extent of shareholding, id. at § 118.
172 The application by the transferee for membership takes the form of sending
the transfer to the company. Where the articles do not reserve a right to refuse a
transfer, the transfer can be compelled. If the right of refusal is retained, then the
question arises whether it is in the unfettered discretion of the directors or subject to
cause. The directors have to exercise their discretion bona fide and not for any collateral
purpose. See Greene, M. R., in In re Smith & Fawcett, Ltd., 119421 Ch. 304. In the case
of partially paid shares the transferor will desire a swift transfer, since for one year
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the transfer is refused because the transferor had no right to execute it,
the transferor holds the share in trust for the transferee" and the
transferee will have to indemnify the transferor. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides, however, that once there has been indorsement
and delivery, there is a duty on the transferor to seek the registration
of the transferee on the books of the corporation.'
The share certificate is issued under the seal of the company and,
although it is not a contractual document,'" it does provide the holder
with "prima facie evidence of the title.'"" The certificate will contain
two very important statements; first, it will disclose that at the time
of its issuance, the person named therein was the holder of the desig-
nated number of shares and second, it will indicate whether those shares
are fully paid up. These statements are made by the company to be
acted upon. The company will, therefore, be estopped from denying
these facts. The first is a statement of ownership at the time of issue
and is not a continuing statement. It is available only to a bona fide
purchaser,'" and only where the certificate has been issued by a prop-
erly authorised officer of the company.'" Thus, where in reliance on
this share certificate, a bona fide purchaser acquires the shares, he will
ask the company for entry into the register. This may well result in the
company being estopped from denying the validity of the certificate.
Yet, it may also have to reinstate the true owner of the shares to the
register if the transfer was invalid without the knowledge of the bona
fide purchaser who relied on the certificate!"
he remains liable to be placed on the B list of contributors in case of a winding up of
the company.
173 etevenson v. Wilson, [1907] S.C. 445; Hardoon v. Belio, [1901] A.C. 118 (P.C.).
The transferee will be the equitable owner, Hawks v. McArthur, [1951] 1 All. E.R. 22
and will have to indemnify the transferor, Spencer v. Ashworth Partington & Co., [1925]
1 K.B. 589 (CA.). Here the transfer was in blank and the share had been transferred to
a third party.
174 UCC § 8-316 indicates that the transferee can demand the assistance of the
transferor, though if the purchase was not for value, he will have to reimburse him.
179 South London Greyhound Racecourses v. Wake, [1931] 1 Ch. 496.
176 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 81.
177 Romer, L.J. in Rainford v. James Keith & Blackman Co., [1905] 2 Ch. 147, 154,
"The only representation is that of the date of the certificate the person named therein
was the owner of the shares." The claimant must have relied on this representation and
this is possible even though he be an original recipient. Balkis Consol. Co. v. Tomkinson,
[1893] A.C. 396 (H.L.). Note the company is also bound by a statement that the share
is fully paid up, Bloomenthal v. Ford, [1897] A.C. 156 (H.L.). The holder will be able
to pass on these shares free from liability to make up any outstanding calls, even though
a purchaser from him has notice of the true facts. Barrow's Case, 14 Ch. D. 432 (1880)
(CA.). Cf. Buckley, Companies Act (12th ed. 1949). This would result in the company
not getting the par value for such shares.
179 Thus where there has been a forgery, an estoppel cannot arise, Ruben v. Great
Fingall Consol. Co., [1906] A.C. 439 (H.L.), for it would not have been the act of the
company which caused the representation. But see Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co., [1912]
A.C. 716 (H.L.). Note UCC § 8-205.
179 Note that there would here be an overissue if both the true owner and the bona
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Once an application for transfer has been filed with the company,
it will communicate with the registered owner to determine whether the
transfer is one he has authorised. This procedure is followed by the
company because it is vulnerable to suit and subsequent damages where
it registers a transfer which is invalid or forged.'" There is, however,
little worth in obtaining a signature attestation, because its value as
evidence in the event of forgery is doubtful and its usefulness as a
deterrent against forgery seems non-existent."' Generally, the transfer
involves delivery of the share certificate to the transferee, for the
seller will have disposed of the totality of his holding. Where this is not
the case, the transferor will most likely be the one who will apply to the
company to have the purchase registered. In such case, the company
will certify that it has received documents which prima fade indicate
that the transferor has title to the number of shares about to be trans-
ferred. There is, however, no representation that the transferor has
title. This distinction between the share certificate and the certification
of title to shares, has been attacked recently by a Law Revision Com-
mittee?' It is claimed that representation of title should be applicable
not only to transfers made by the company itself, but also to transac-
tions on the stock exchanges or in blank. Also, the protection afforded
by the representation to a person taking a certificate that the shares
exist should also apply to a certification to the same extent as if the
fide purchaser were entitled to shares. In English Jaw the bona fide purchaser will be
left to have his remedy in damages against the company, and the true owner will be
restored to the register. Re Bahia & San Francisco Ry. Co., L.R., 3 Q.B. 584 (1868).
Compare TJCC 8-104 permitting the corporation to purchase a security in the open
market for the person injured. This is not possible in English law, Trevor v. Whitworth,
12 App. Cas. 409 (1887) (ELL.). German law permits it subject to restrictions, AktG.
65. French law also permits repurchase, but it is doubtful whether they can be kept
as treasury shares. Escarra, Droit Commercial, No, 888 (1952).
122 Welch v. Bank of England, [1955] Ch. 508. Failure to reply does not estop the
owner from subsequently raising his title, Barton v. London & North Western Ry. Co.,
24 Q.E.D. 77 (C.A. 1889). There is a remedy against the person who lodged the forged
transfer, Welch v. Bank of England, supra, and if he was innocent, a permissive remedy
would apply. Forged Transfer Acts, 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 43 and 1892, 55 & 56 Vitt.,
c. 36.
181 The Report of the Committee on the Transfer of Securities, Dec. 1960, Stock
Exchange, London, at 11 27(b), under Lord Ritchie recommended:
We suggest that the attestation [of signatures of transferers] should be replaced
by the stamp of the selling agent as emphasising his legal responsibility for war-
ranting the genuineness of the document he puts forward. Signatures in the case
of non-Market transactions should be confirmed by professional persons, e.g.,
Bankers and Solicitors. We believe this is in the best interest of the investor
since it is more important to make forgery as difficult as possible than to pro-
vide for compensation if a forgery is successful.
Whether a signature guaranty is the answer is doubtful, but no better method has so
far occurred. The French approach is rather cumbersome, i.e., appearance at the office
of the company, see discussion supra.
122 Jenkins Committee, Cmnd. 1749/62, if 482 criticises this distinction which is
made by Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 79.
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transferee had been shown a share certificate, i.e., the company should
be estopped from denying title when it has certificated the documents.
However, the only recommended change made by the Law Revision
Committee was that the provisions allowing a company to evade re-
sponsibility for the unauthorised acts of its agent in certifying the
existence of shares should be narrowly construed so that wherever the
agent has apparent authority, the company should be bound."'
In this respect, English and American laws are drawing closer
together. The circumstance here envisaged is where, because of its
previous conduct, the company is precluded from denying the authority
of the agent. The mere fact that an agency exists will not be enough;
there must be more, i.e., a "holding out" which is relied upon by a third
party in dealing with the agent. The approach in England appears to
be that the employee is assumed to be an honest agent and the company
is to be protected in the rare case of a dishonest agent. 184 Commercially,
this presumption is unsound when it results in placing the loss on a
third party dealing with the agent. The principal is in a much better
position to assess the honesty of his agent and is much better able to
guard against his dishonest acts.'" Moreover, it was he who placed the
agent in the position where he could act dishonestly. Thus, the burden
should be on the principal rather than on the third party who deals with
the agent.
This argument has been adopted by the Uniform Commercial
Code which provides an objective standard to determine the corpora-
tion's liability to a purchaser for value who lacks notice of a forgery or
unauthorised signature."° The liability of the corporation depends upon
its having entrusted the wrongdoer with the responsibility for the sign-
ing the security or similar securities, the immediate preparation for
signing or the responsible handling187
 of the security. Liability will also
lie for the acts of a sub-agent when someone so entrusted delegates
these duties.
This not only makes more explicit those situations which preclude
the corporation from setting up the defence of lack of authority, but it
also places the burden of choosing a responsible and reliable agent on
the corporation. The responsibility is confined, however, only to an
agent who has been entrusted with the duties set out in the Code.'" The
183
 Id. at 1483(k), relating to Companies Act, 1948, § 79(3).
184
 This reflects the approach of the Negotiable Instrument Law, 5 U.LA. 23; see
Buckley v. Second Nat'l Bank, 35 N.J.L. 400 (1872) ; Budelman v. White's Express &
Transfer Co., 49 N.J. Super. 511, 140 A.2d 552 (1958).
185 E.g., by taking a fidelity bond.
186 UCC § 8-205.
187 Is this an extension of the "Organic Theory" of corporate responsibility? It
seems much wider since it extends to even minor officials if they were entrusted to act.
See Gower, Modern Company Law (2d ed. 1957).
188 See UCC H 8-205, 8-208; note UCC § 8-406.
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form by which such duties must be conferred is not prescribed. Negli-
gence or apparent authority is not needed to make the corporation
liable. A difficulty is met by the phrase "entrusted with responsible
handling of the security" in Section 8-205. It has not yet been deter-
mined how far this phrase is synonymous with "scope of employment."
Where the transfer is signed by a personal representative, English
law requires that he produce evidence of his due appointment. This
would be evidence of probate of the will, letters of administration or
confirmation as executor.'" Similarly, only a person under the authority
of an order in lunacy can act for a person of unsound mind. 190 There is
no need for these representatives to become members of the com-
pany."' Of course, the company is not concerned whether they, in
making the transfer, are complying with the terms of their trust."'
The Uniform Commercial Code, in Section 8-308(3), names those
who are deemed "appropriate persons" to execute indorsements for the
purpose of transferring shares in a corporation governed by the Code.
Section 8-308(6) indicates that the time of signing determines whether
the person is an "appropriate person." A subsequent change of circum-
stances will not affect the signature.
In connection with the existence of equitable rights, there has
developed in the United States the Taney doctrine."' This has resulted
in excessive documentation of share transfers. English law indicates
that a company is under no duty to inquire into the propriety of a par-
ticular transfer and thus need not accept any intimation of the existence
of a trust in regard to the shares on its register!" This rule applies
even in those instances where, having refused to register a transfer, the
company is aware that there is a possibility that the registered holder
is holding the shares in trust for another."' This rule, which became
189 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 82.
190 Lunacy Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 5, §% 133-38.
191 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 76. It is usual to have provisions to
this effect in the articles of association, see Companies Act, 1948, First Schedule, Table
A, Part I, Arts. 29-32. If such personal representatives desire to be registered, they be-
come personally liable for outstanding calls even though they are designated as personal
representatives on the register: Buchan's Case, 4 App. Cas. 549 (ILL. 1879).
192 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 117; see also Companies Act, 1948, First
Schedule, Table A, Part I, Art. 7. Note, however, R.S.C. Order 46, Rules 3-11, as to a
notice in lieu of distringas as to dealings with shares.
193 Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848).
194 Supra note 192.
195 Note here the danger of an exempt private company losing its exemption as a
result of a transfer of shares to a corporation which is not itself an exempt private
company. See Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 129 and Schedule 7. Although the
company may refuse to register the transfer, the transferor becomes the nominee of the
corporate transferee. A difficulty may thus arise in regard to the certificate which must
be filed annually to claim the exempt status. The Board of Trade may waive a temporary
breach, Companies Act, 1948, § 129(1).
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established in English law at an early stage,'" later was embodied into
statutory law.'" At first, American courts also followed this ap-
proach.'" An issuer could effectuate a transfer of securities to a fidu-
ciary and, thereafter, transfer the shares in accordance with the
instructions of the fiduciary without inquiring into the rightfulness of
the transfer. The only duty was to satisfy itself that the fiduciary was
duly constituted as such.
Judge Taney in Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers Bane° indi-
cated that he considered the corporation
the custodian of the shares of stock, and clothed with power
sufficient to protect the rights of every one interested, from
unauthorized transfers; it is a trust placed in the hands of the
corporation for the protection of individual interests, and like
every other trustee, it is bound to execute the trust with
proper diligence and care, and is responsible for any injury
sustained by its negligence or misconduct.'"
Thus the corporation was held liable for a transfer in contravention of
provisions in a will, treated by the learned judge as a public document
once probate had been granted.
Much litigation followed the adoption of this rule and the legisla-
tures have been kept busy in attempts to limit it."' Great uncertainty
surrounds the question of "knowledge" of facts that the transfer is in
breach of a fiduciary duty. As a result, transfer agents required in-
demnities to protect themselves and, thereby, the cost of transfer was
increased?" Article 8 does not completely clear the trust from the
register of the corporation. It does, however, limit the proof which can
be required by a transfer agent and protects the agent from liability
if he complies with the provisions of the Article.'"
An English company which refuses to register a transfer must so
notify the applicant within two months of receipt of the application. 20'
196 Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves, Jun. 56, 30 Eng. Rep. 891 (Ch. 1796).
107 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, § 20. See now
Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, § 117.
	 •
198 Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 50 Va. (6 Leigh) 399 (1835); Hutchins v. State
Bank, 47 Mass. (12 Metc.) 421 (1847) .
199 Supra note 193.
299 Id. at 1047.
201 See Uniform Fiduciary Act, 9B. U.L.A.; Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer
Act, adopted in Connecticut, Delaware and Illinois; The Uniform Act for Simplification
of Fiduciary Security Transfers.
202 See Braucher, Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 193, 194
(1958) as to the involved procedures established; Christy, The Transfer of Stock, § 225
(3d ed. 1958), as to the form adopted by those involved in attempting to evade respon-
sibility under the doctrine and Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 33, 34 (1957) as to the resultant exorbitant cost.
203 UCC §1 8-402, 8-404.
209 Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, §§ 78, 80.
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Such refusal may be due to the restrictive nature of the company's
membership or the company may have a lien on the shares. Any such
liens would have to be reserved in the articles of association, since
these are the basis of the contract between the shareholders and the
company, and being public documents their contents are deemed to
be known to anyone having dealings with the company 2 05 Since, in
the United States, the articles are not treated quite in the same way,
and in view of the negotiability of the share certificate, the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 8-103 requires that the lien be noted on
the security?" The notification must be "conspicuous," i.e., "so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it.i 20'
The articles of association of an English company therefore con-
tain any provision authorising the company to exercise a lien in respect
to outstanding calls or in respect to any other debts owed to the
company by the shareholder. In this connection, a conflict of claims
may very well arise. Thus, although Section 117 of the 1948 Companies
Act"' provides that the company need not take notice of any trust,
and the articles generally extend this to any equitable lien claimed
against the share by an outsider, can the company set up its own lien
as against a transferee? It is submitted that although such claims or
liens are not binding upon the company, surely it would be inequitable
to allow it, nonetheless, to claim a priority over such liens or claims
where it has notice thereof.' 9 Where the company's lien would be
effective and the company has the right to refuse to register a transfer,
the better view appears to be that the registration of such transfer does
not amount to a waiver of the lien 2 10 Should other shares have been
205 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Ltd., [1909] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.) ; Mahony v.
East Holyford Mining Co., L.R., 7 H.L. 869, 893 (1875). Note, however, that the Lon-
don Stock Exchange requires that shares can only be traded on the exchange if the
articles provide that fully paid up shares are free from all liens. Rules of the Stock
Exchange, London, Appendix 34, 178-186.
206 By using the term noted, the Code obviates the difficulty previously caused by
the term stated, since this was sometimes construed as requiring the whole lien to be set
forth.
2" UCC § 1-201 (10) ; Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d
812 (1957).
208 Supra note 150. New London & Brazilian Bank v. Brocklebank, 21 Ch. D. 302
(CA. 1882).
aoo In Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs, 12 App. Cas. 29 (H.L. 1886), notice of a
mortgage of the shares was given priority over a lien in the company arising subsequent
to the receipt of such notice. Section 117 refers to notice of a "trust." Is notice of a
mortgage excluded from the section? Normally the articles extend the exemption to
"equitable, contingent, future or partial interest." Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150,
First Schedule, Table A, Part I, Art. 7. Does this exclude the mortgage in Briggs? Gower,
op. cit. supra note 187 suggests the prior notice would be effective, sed quaere, McArthur
v. Gulf Line, Ltd. (1909) S.C. 732 (Scotland).
210 Bank of Africa v. Salisbury Gold Mining Co., [1892] A.C. 281 (P.C.). An
estoppel may arise, however, In re W. Key & Son Ltd., [1902] 1 Ch. 467, and where only
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retained, however, it could be claimed that the lien attaches only to
those retained. 211
Various criticisms of the two months delay have been voiced in
England. One such criticism points out that the delay enables the
directors to prevent a shareholder suspected of being obstreperous
from exercising his rights at a forthcoming stockholders' meeting.
Also, in some instances, the delay is caused with the collusion of the
transferee so as to prevent the directors from acquiring knowledge
of a shift in power resulting from a concentrated purchase of shares.
To deal with these situations, the recent Law Revision Commission'
recommended that owners of a ten per cent beneficial interest in
equity shares, or in any class of shares, register their acquisitions within
seven days." As to the delay, however, the Commission merely recom-
mended that registration be speeded up to five weeks from the filing
of the transfer, 214
 with power to be in the transferee to apply to the
court and, on showing of good cause, to obtain a declaration ordering
that the transfer be effectuated forthwith.
A further Committee under Lord Ritchie recently recommended
certain alterations in the procedure for the transfer of shares. These
have been partially enacted in the 1963 Stock Transfer Act. 2" The
main attack on the existing system was based on the existence of a
"common form," which required attestation of the transferor's sig-
nature, transfer by deed (should this be required by the company's
articles of association) and various other retarding measures. The first
recommendation by the Ritchie Committee was a "transfer by endorse-
ment and delivery," whereby the equitable right or title to shares was
to be conveyed. The first stage, indorsement, would be on the back of
the certificate 2" and the second, the delivery, would take place when
the holder's agent delivered the certificate to the transferee or his
agent. The intention was to cut down the possibility of the certificate's
becoming bearer paper, with it the resultant dangers of misappropria-
tion and increased revenue liability.
The procedure suggested would involve participation by the stock
a right to refuse a transfer for outstanding debts to the company has been retained, the
transfer may amount to a waiver, Higgs v. Assam Tea Co., L.R. 4 Exch. 387 (1869), for
the transfer effects a novation of the contract between the company and the transferor;
a new contract comes into existence with the transferee.
211 Gray v. Stone and Funnell, 69 L.T. 282 (1893).
212 Jenkins Report 1962, Cmnd. 1749/62.
218 Id. at 1[ 147,
214 Id. at gif 476, 483(d)-(e). It is suggested by the Commission that this will enable
the monthly directors' meeting to deal with the application for transfer. Note also the
proposed amendment of Companies Act, 1948, supra note 150, 116 referred to in the text.
215 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, c. 18.
216 This merely involves the signature of the transferor. There would be no
"endorsement clause" and the signature need not be attested, nor need the transferee
sign. Attestation and signature by the transferee were required under the "common form."
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exchange in the transfer and would become more complicated where
a certification217 by the company would be involved. The use of a
special form of "Notice of Endorsement and Delivery" would require
a transmission to the buying broker who, after completing parts
thereof, would obtain registration of his client on the books of the
company.
This method was rejected by Parliament which adopted an alter-
nate method suggested by the Committee,'" that of "Transfer by the
Stock Transfer Form". The seller here signs a Stock Transfer Form
and hands it to the selling broker, who retains it until the "shapes" are
known.' The "Stock Transfer Form" and a "Broker's Transfer
Form," where more than one sale is involved in the dealings with the
holder's shares, will be certified by the stock exchange which will send
the "Stock Transfer Form" and the share certificate to the company.
If this be an over-the-counter market transaction, the selling broker
will send the "Stock Transfer Form" to the company after having in-
dorsed it The "Broker's Transfer Form" will then be sent to the
buying broker, who will present it to the company for transfer of the
shares to his client. If any shares remain in the hands of the transferor,
the company will have issued a certification prior to the broker's sub-
mitting the "Stock Transfer Form" and "Broker's Transfer Form" to
the stock exchange. The company will then issue new certificates in
the amounts sold and retained.
The 1963 Stock Transfer Act' provides that any registered, fully
paid up security can be transferred by the company upon presentation
to it of the "Stock Transfer Form" executed by the transferor only.
The Form must indicate the full name and address of the transferee."'
The execution of the stock transfer need not be attested."' The pro-
visions of the Act apply, notwithstanding anything in any enactment
or instrument relating to the transfer of such securities."' The Act
thus overrides any provisions in the articles of association of the issuing
company.
217 Certification is discussed above. See also Martin, Share Transfer and Registration
(1951).
218 The Committee itself suggested the alternate method after examining the short-
comings of the first method. Report of the Committee on Transfer of Securities, The
Stock Exchange, London, Dec. 1960, Lord Ritchie, Chairman, 48.
219 "Shapes" is defined in the Report, 51 as "the amounts of each security which
will be the subject of separate deliveries to different purchasers and which will correspond
to the "tickets" passed by the purchasing broker in accordance with the rules of the
Stock Exchange."
220 Where a number of "shapes" are involved, a "Broker's Transfer Form" would
be indorsed and passed to the buying broker or to the company as to each "shape."
227 Supra note 215.
222 Id. at 1(1) and Schedule 1.
223 Id. at 	 1(2).
224 Id. at § 2(1).
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Although rejecting the keeping of shares in "street" names as
adding to the complications rather than reducing them, the Ritchie
Committee was prepared to consider the introduction of a Stock Ex-
change Nominee system, whereby all sales would be to and by the
Stock Exchange Nominee (SENOM). In effect, this method amounts
to the existing clearing house procedure, adopted by the Uniform
Commercial Code225
 and previously noted in connection with the
French Sicovam.' The need to centralise the English stock ex-
changes=" and to modernise them by the introduction of electronic
devices was recognised by the Committee. This study, however, is still
in the investigatory stage and no useful purpose can be served to dis-
cuss this matter further at present. Not until there is a change in
approach by the English stock exchanges can such modernisation occur.
Delays are still accepted as normal; thus, the present two weeks settle-
ment delay on the stock exchange is not considered unreasonable but
rather it is deemed conducive to exactitude 228
 The attempts to speed
up transfer of stocks by means of the new method of the "Stock Trans-
fer Form" is, however, to be welcomed.
V
Arising out of the discussion of the means by which a share can
be transferred, two important aims seem to crystallize. The transferor
wishes to facilitate the easy acquisition of the rights embodied in the
instrument transferred and the transferee wishes to acquire these
rights without interference from anyone claiming rights in the instru-
ment. The Code purports to introduce "a negotiable instrument law
dealing with securities.""° In defining an investment security, it re-
quires that the instrument be "commonly dealt in upon security ex-
changes or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium of investment."' Although it avoids
the pitfalls of the Negotiable Instrument Law"' and follows the policy
of the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 232
 enabling merchants to
225 UCC § 8-320.
226 Societê interprofessionnelle pour la compensation des valeurs mobilifires.
227
 Note however the setting up of a new stock exchange in Edinburgh last year.
228 Supra note 85, at 21. In the United States, the time is usually four days. In
rejecting the "North American system," though recognising it as speedier, the Committee
indicated that it has been geared to cash dealings but it would not be more economical
in terms of labour. This is a clear reference to the absence in England of mechanisation
(automation) in this field. Yet it is the lapse of time the Committee was set up to help
eliminate. Sometimes more than three months would elapse from the time of the purchase
to the final entry on the register and receipt of a share certificate by the buyer.
229 Official Comments to UCC 8-101.
230 UCC 8-102(1) (a) (.1) •
231 5 U.L.A.	 1, i.e., an unconditional promise, etc. (requirements which might be
apposite to short term credit devices but not to investment instruments).
232 45 and 46 Viet., c. 61.
522
CORPORATE STOCK TRANSFERS
develop new instruments within the purview of the Code as commercial
necessity may arise, it is unfortunate that the Code insists upon the
presence of certain formal requisites such as issuance of the security
"in bearer or registered form." 2" This requirement, dependent on the
form of issue and not on any subsequent indorsement,' may negate
the lead shown by the functional definition. Despite a practice that may
result in certain instruments being dealt with as "media of investment,"
Article 8 will not be applicable merely because the instrument runs to
order rather than to a bearer or to a registered holder. The exclusion
of "order" instruments from the purview of Article 8 is a policy deci-
sion, the reasons for which are not apparent. 2"
Let us now examine the result of this restriction. In German law,
the nominal share is clearly a "medium for investment" and it is
"commonly dealt in upon security exchanges." But since it is negotiable
and payable to order, even though this may not be discernible from the
face of the share certificate, it would be excluded from the definition
of a security given by Article 8. Similar objections can be made with
regard to the French nominal share or the English share certificate.
It may be contended that these are not the types of securities to which
the Code was intended to apply. However, there would have been no
difficulty in expanding the requirement of form to include the order
security nor in removing the question of form entirely from the
requirements of Article 8 and, thus, to leave the functional definition
to govern its applicability.
The functional definition raises no difficulty with regard to shares
which are originally non-negotiable. No change of locus in quo will
make such shares negotiable by being "dealt in" as such in "any area."
The law of the place of issuance normally will govern the negotiability
of a security, but Article 8 refers to the law of the place of the or-
ganisation of the issuer.'" Although these two laws are not necessarily
the same, a reference to these laws should prevent negotiability being
imposed on instruments not intended to have such status.
An argument in favour of excluding the foreign share from the
purview of Article 8 may be the recent development of the American
Depositary Receipt. This method of investment in foreign corporations
works in the following manner. An American issuing house or trust
company which invests in a foreign corporation will appear as the
shareholder of a nominal share on the register of such foreign corpora-
tion, or it may hold bearer shares in the foreign corporation. The
na ucc 8-102(1) (a) (i).
234 UCC §§ 8-102(c), (d).
295 The negotiability of such instruments may develop outside Article 8. UCC
§§ 3-102, 3-103. See Branches, UCC Article 3—Commercial Paper—New York Variations,
17 Rutgers L. Rev. 57 (1962).
236 See text accompanying note 44, supra.
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American corporation will then sell depositary receipts to investors in
this country for American dollars. The receipt, indicating the number
of shares held for the American investor in the named foreign corpora-
tion, entitles him to dividends, payable in dollars, from the American
company, after the latter has received dividends and has subtracted
administrative costs. In effect these depositary receipts are very
similar to investment certificates in the portfolio of an American in-
vestment corporation. Their number has now reached proportions of
such dimensions, and demand for them has been created to such an
extent, that they are themselves being traded on the stock exchanges."'
In so far as the American corporation is concerned, it treats the holders
of such depositary receipts in the same way as a clearing house
might do; i.e., by balancing its accounts to reflect transactions with
the depositary receipts. Since they are media for investment and are
either being dealt in upon the security exchanges or over-the-counter
markets, such depositary receipts would fall under Article 8 of the
Code?" The American corporation would constitute an "issuer" under
Section 8-201(1).
The ultimate aim of the commercial law is to bring about the uni-
fication not only of the commercial laws within a federal system, but
internationally as well. Commerce knows very few international bound-
aries outside those set by national security. The Uniform Commercial
Code has drawn heavily on German precedents, but fortunately the
influence of the common law has not been lost. It is submitted, that
being a purely national product, it can only serve as a starting point
for any future international unification of law.
A much more serious effort has been made in Europe, where the
Common Market has forced members to consider unifying their laws.
The Treaty of Rome" contains provisions for the freedom of
establishment in member countries by individuals and by corporations
"under the conditions laid down by the country of establishment
for its own nationals."' Though the Treaty facilitates the ready flow
of capital and labour, it does not create order out of the chaos
resulting from the variance of corporate laws. In general, these
237 Europe's Securities Lure U.S. Investors, 35 Investor's Reader, No. 8, 1.
299 UCC § 8-320 would thus apply. Also note that they are subject to the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 ( 1958).
239 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. U.N.T.S., Vol. 298 1,
no. 4300 (1958).
249 Id. at Art. 52. Art. 58, relating to companies, states:
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central management or main establishment within , the
Community shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions of this Chapter, be
assimilated to natural persons being nationals of Member States. . . . The term
"companies" shall mean companies under civil or commercial law including co-
operative companies and other legal persons under public or private law, with
the exception of non-profit making companies.
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corporate laws firmly control the activities of corporations formed
under them by requiring strict compliance with their provisions.' As
a result, certain industries, affecting more than one country, must be
carried on by corporations which are governed, not by national laws,
but by the provisions of special conventions." It is clear that the
ordinary commercial corporation does not warrant such special treat-
ment."
Recognising this difficulty, the Treaty of Rome provides:
Member States shall, in so far as necessary, engage in ne-
gotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the
benefit of their nationals: ... the mutual recognition of com-
panies within the meaning of Article 58, second paragraph,'
the maintenance of their legal personality in cases where the
registered office is transferred from one country to another,2"
and the possibility for companies subject to the municipal law
of Member States to form mergers 246
It was realised that the unification of corporation laws in the
member states would be too great a task. A European Commercial
Company was, therefore, proposed by Professor Sanders." It was to
embody the principal approaches of the differing corporation laws and
it was not to be subject to the common form of European taxation'
but rather only to the tax laws of the country wherein it was situate.
Such European corporations would be available to those commercial
enterprises having transactions crossing existing national borders, and
would exist side by side with corporations formed under present na-
tional laws. At the International Congress held in Paris in June 1960,
the idea was adopted and five commissions were set up to study the
241 Germany: AktG. (1937); France: The law of July 24, 1867 and its amendments
as well as the Code de Commerce.
242 Note, e.g., Franco-Swiss Convention of October 20, 1949 setting up the Bale
Airport.
243 In 1951, a proposal by the Council of Europe for the creation of a European
company to exploit public services, failed because of unpopular attempts to give it a
favourable tax position.
244 Supra note 240.
243
 E.g., German law does not permit a domestic corporation to move its seat
(domicile) out of the country. B.G.H. Bd. 19, 5.105. An attempt to do so will be deemed
a decision to dissolve the corporation, R.G. Bd. 88, S.54; A.G. Bd. 107, S.97. Even though
the corporation is generally foreign controlled the statutory domicile must be in Germany,
A.G. Bd. 99, 5.218; A.G. Bd. 177, 5.217.
246 Supra note 239, Art. 220. Note the document recently presented by the E.E.C.
Commission to the Council. "Proposition d'une directive du Conseil tendant a coordonner,
pour les rendre aquivalentes, les garanties qui sont exigaes, dans les Etats membres, des
soda& au sense de l'article 58, alinka 2 du Traite, pour proteger les intarets tant des
associes que des tiers. III/COM(63)520 final, Bruxelles, le 19 favrier 1964."
247 Vers une Societé anonyme, Droit European 9 (1960).
248 Supra note 243.
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various problems involved in establishing such a corporation.' Un-
fortunately, the resultant draft contains little of Anglo-American juris-
prudence. For the purposes of this paper it is interesting to note that
the commission considering the shares of the European Commercial
Company recommended that there should be a minimum share capital
divided into nominal and issued capital,'" and that the shares, having
a fixed par value,' should be either bearer or registered shares, but
should not be transferable until fully paid up.' Although these recom-
mendations have not yet been acted upon, they do show a progressive
trend, one contributed to in no small way by the Uniform Commercial
Code.
249 Congres International pour la Creation d'une Societe Commerciale de Type
Europeen, Revue du Marche Common (1960).
250 The source here was the Netherland Naatntoze Vennotschap rather than the
English limited company.
251 A rule of general application outside the North American continent. The value
fixed upon was 100 New Francs or its equivalent European unit.
252 This requirement sought to create negotiability and thus the German rather than
the French approach was adopted.
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